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Combatting corruption in the developing world has been a formidable challenge and taken a prominent 
place in the agenda of the international development community for the last two decades. Nonetheless, 
the results and outcomes of conventional anti-corruption interventions continue to be modest at best 
(Marquette and Pfeiffer, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011). This is often reflected in the so-called 
implementation gap, whereby countries adopting sound legal and organisational anti-corruption 
frameworks continue to experience very high levels of corruption.  
A growing critique has centred on the perception that many anti-corruption reforms and interventions 
fail to take into account and understand the local contexts in which they operate (Haruna, 2003; Mette 
Kjaer, 2004; Rugumyamheto, 2004). Also, several authors have argued that in developing countries 
corruption is fuelled by a large scale collective action problem where behaving corruptly represents a 
sensible choice for most individuals, whether because they expect everyone else to behave corruptly or 
because corruption is functional – as means to an end (Marquette and Pfeiffer, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2013; Persson et al., 2013). When this is the case, it is therefore unsurprising that conventional anti-
corruption instruments yield limited results. 
Thus, there is a need to re-think the practice of anti-corruption on the basis of evidence about the 
factors that drive corruption in different contexts, including the incentives, expectations and agendas 
across all groups in society (Baez-Camargo and Passas, 2017). In particular, it is necessary to 
understand the motivations shaping the behaviours of ordinary citizens who, although most sharply 
suffering the costs from the misuse of public funds, may nonetheless tolerate or even participate in 
corruption (Wrong, 2014). Thus, while much has been written in the literature about the potential of 
bottom-up collective action to stand up against corrupt government and state officials (Johnston, 2014; 
Landell-Mills, 2013; Mcneil and Malena, 2010), this potential may only be unleashed if the factors 
shaping attitudes towards corruption among citizens are properly addressed.  
As the World Bank’s 2015 World Development Report (WDR) on human decision-making compellingly 
argued, behavioural studies present a promising - but the most part unexplored - approach to improve 
development policies by incorporating a better understanding of how individuals make choices in their 
everyday lives. In fact, by suggesting that “fostering collective action is not purely a matter of 
incentivising self-interested individuals” (World Bank, 2015, p. 61), the 2015 WDR has invited scholars 
and practitioners to consider not only how quasi-rational and socio-cultural factors may play a role in 
perpetuating vicious cycles of poverty and weak governance, but also how those same factors may be 
creatively harnessed towards achieving better development outcomes. This stance was echoed in the 
UK Institute for Government’s 2010 Mindspace Report on ‘Influencing Behaviour through Public Policy’, 
which stated that "shaping policy more closely around our inbuilt responses to the world offers a 
potentially powerful way to improve individual wellbeing and social welfare" (Dolan et al., 2010 p.8).  
This literature review is part of a pioneering research effort commissioned by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) through its East Africa Research Fund (EARF) that explores the utility 
of behavioural economics for the study of petty corruption.1 The review has been conducted following a 
                                                      
1 For more information about the EARF and the research project “Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa” please visit 
http://www.earesearchfund.org/ and http://www.earesearchfund.org/research-corruption-social-norms-and-behaviors-east-africa. 
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rigorous methodological approach and it aims to contribute evidence conducive to the feasibility of 
developing of anti-corruption interventions based on behavioural principles. 2 
The review addresses two main review questions: 
1. What behavioural factors having an impact on individual attitudes towards petty corruption have 
been identified in the literature? 
2. What does the evidence suggest about the relative effectiveness of different types of 
interventions to address petty corruption? 
 
The report is organised as follows: 
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the WDR framework of human decision-making and lays out 
working definitions for key concepts utilised throughout the review. Section 3 is devoted to the review 
of the literature shedding light into behavioural factors that have a bearing on how individuals make 
decisions associated with practices of petty corruption. Section 4 presents the evidence from the 
comparative assessment of selected anti-corruption interventions. Section 5 provides a synthesis 
analysis integrating all reviewed studies, outlining the main messages learned and discussing the policy 
implications of the systematic review for the development of interventions to tackle petty corruption. 
  
                                                      
2 The present semi-systematic review is an abridged version intended for use by policy practitioners - concisely summarising and discussing all 
policy-relevant findings and insights yielded by a much longer and more detailed review semi-systematic review of Drivers of Petty Corruption 
and Behavioural Anti-Corruption Interventions in Developing Countries (Stahl et al., forthcoming), commissioned by DFID’s East Africa 
Research Fund commissioned and conducted by the Basel Institute on Governance in the course of 2016. The long version provides more 
detail and depth about research-relevant insights and crucial aspects of the research designs, including study characteristics, methodological 
choices and research methods. This review is not a fully systematic but adheres to systematic principles of rigour, transparency and 
replicability (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2013) – having followed a systematic search strategy, having compiled a search log and having made 
use of two established review methods:  
• A grounded-theory driven approach (GTR) to summarising behavioural drivers of petty corruption following a behavioural-economic 
conceptual framework of human decision-making (Wolfswinkel et al., 2013, World Bank, 2015). 
• A textual narrative synthesis (TNS) of effective behavioural and non-behavioural (social accountability) interventions targeting petty 
corruption in developing countries (Popay et al., 2006). 
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2 Definitions and conceptual 
challenges 
2.1 The 2015 WDR framework 
The 2015 WDR “Mind, Society and Behaviour” emphasised that common approaches to development 
policy making can be improved by considering cognitive psychological models of decision-making and 
human behaviour. In addition to dominant approaches of classic rational choice and economic theory, 
the WDR authors call for supplementary strategies based on behavioural-economic insights that take 
into account evidence on the determinants of human choice and action paying attention both to mind 
processes and to the impact of historical experience and social influences.   
This review follows the conceptual framework laid out by the 2015 WDR that identifies three broad 
principles of human decision making: 
1. “Thinking automatically” refers to the propensity of people to make most judgments and 
choices automatically, rather than deliberatively. Thus, decisions may respond to the presence 
of frames, which refer to the way choices are presented (e.g. as a loss or a gain). Automatic 
thinking can also be associated to anchors, which are contextual aspects that have no direct 
relevance to a decision but that nonetheless affect judgement, leading individuals to jump to 
conclusions on very partial views of the problem. Choices may also be made on the basis of 
default options, which might be based on the modal patterns of behaviour prevailing in any 
given social context.  
 
2. “Thinking socially” recognises that the way in which people act and think often depends on 
what others around them do and think. Thus, social preferences, social norms, social identities 
and social networks can exert a decisive influence on decision making because people care 
about their surroundings and strive to align with the patterns adhered to by the groups they 
identify with. Thus, engaging with the social determinants of individual choice involves taking 
into account intangible dimensions such as status, respect, shaming, and guilt, which may exert 
inordinate impact on patterns of decision making compared to other, perhaps more visible, 
factors. 
 
3. “Thinking with mental models” means that individuals in any given society share common 
perspectives and ideas through which they make sense of the world around them. In other 
words, decision-making relies on concepts, categories, identities, prototypes, stereotypes 
causal narratives and worldviews drawn from one’s environment. Mental models can refer to 
the macro level, where individuals share a collective vision of how things work around them, 
which might be shaped by factors such as history, ideology, religion and exposure to different 
types of institutions. Mental models can also apply to the micro level, where an individual’s self-
concept may consist of multiple identities, each associated with different norms that dictate 
adequate behaviours for different situations. 
2.2 Defining petty corruption 
Corruption is generally defined in terms similar to those of Transparency International, which 
understands corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (see also Tanzi, 1998; 
Kaufmann, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Klitgaard et al., 2000). This general definition can be further 
refined according to different types of corruption such as grand corruption, petty corruption or political 
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corruption – which depend on the scale and magnitude the corrupt transaction, the actors involved as 
well as the sector where such corrupt transaction occurs (Transparency International, n.d.).  
A review of the literature reveals that petty corruption - also often labelled administrative or 
bureaucratic corruption - has been defined in many different ways, ranging from definitions that are 
broad and general to those that focus on particular phenomena. For instance, Transparency 
International defines petty corruption as the ‘everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level 
public officials in their interaction with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or 
services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies’ (Transparency 
International n.d.). According to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4 Anti Corruption Resource 
Centre, n.d.), administrative or petty corruption takes place at the “implementation end of politics 
[policies], where public officials meet the public” most commonly in the form of acts of bribery or abuse 
of power in day-to-day situations. A recent systematic review on corruption identified petty corruption 
primarily on the basis that it involves small amounts of money and as such it may manifest in different 
forms and have different aims such as to “demand extra payment for the provision of government 
services; make speed money payments to expedite bureaucratic procedures; pay bribes to allow 
actions that violate rules and regulations […] obtain posts or secure promotion, or the mutual exchange 
of favours” (DFID, 2015, p. 13).  
Although it is clear that petty corruption can manifest in many different manners, much attention has 
been given to bribery as a most conspicuous form of petty corruption.3 Thus, in the literature one 
encounters definitions that seek to differentiate among different types of bribes. Basu (quoted in Abbink 
et al. 2014) suggests that bribes are not limited to situations where a citizen pays to receive contracts 
or services from public officials in an expedited manner. Often, officials demand bribes even for 
delivering citizens their entitled services such as an admission to the hospital or approval of a passport. 
This latter situation involves what may be termed “harassment bribes”. In turn, collusive bribery 
happens when citizens and officials exchange favours at the cost of the public and whereby bribes are 
paid to obtain a favourable service that the briber is not entitled to (Abbink et al. 2014). Speed or 
grease money is another term that refers to the bribes given and taken in order to ensure that services 
are provided satisfactorily (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999). 
There are significant conceptual challenges in defining and operationalizing a phenomenon as complex 
and multidimensional as petty corruption. In fact, as one seeks to move away from generic definitions 
to develop more precise and nuanced conceptualisations of petty corruption, the endeavour of arriving 
at universally applicable criteria becomes increasingly problematic. As Torsello (2011, p. 3) argues, at 
the root of the problem may be the fact that “the dichotomy private-public, informed by the Weberian 
rationality of the western bureaucratic machinery, is context-specific." This is so, because practices that 
fall within the scope of what may be “normally” understood as petty corruption may be illegal or not 
depending on the context but also, and perhaps more significantly, because most conventional 
definitions of petty corruption fail to capture the extent to which such practices may have or not social 
acceptability. For instance, it is significant that several of the reviewed sources focusing on regions as 
diverse as Sub Saharan Africa, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe, point out that practices of gift 
giving are extremely difficult to neatly separate into categories of corrupt or non-corrupt because they 
are associated to socially valued expressions of gratitude, congratulations or sympathy and tend to be 
                                                      
3 For instance Jain (2001, p. 75) defines petty corruption as a circumstance where “the public may be required to bribe bureaucrats to receive 
a service to which they are entitled or to speed up the bureaucratic process” whereas Djawadi and Fahr (2013) identify petty corruption as the 
“bribes that are offered by private citizens to lower level public officials for receiving special treatment, to which they are otherwise not legally 
entitled to." 
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widespread (Ruud 2000; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Chang et al. 2001; Moldovan et al., 2013; 
Stepurko et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2000). 
For the aforementioned reasons, and because this review seeks to shed light into behavioural factors 
impacting attitudes towards petty corruption, a broad approach to defining petty corruption has been 
deemed most appropriate in order to capture the various manners in which individuals understand petty 
corruption and the practices associated with it in their local contexts. Therefore, this review focuses on 
informal transactions (i.e. those that do not adhere to formal processes and rules) involving low to mid-
level officials on one side and ordinary citizens on the other. In this regard, the terms citizen and user 
are used interchangeably and the same applies to the terms public official and service provider. 
2.3 Defining behavioural and social accountability interventions 
One of the main goals of the present study is to review the evidence on the relative effectiveness of 
different types of interventions addressing petty corruption. Therefore, it is important to provide clarity 
on what are the defining elements that constitute alternative anti-corruption approaches. In particular, 
this review discusses top-down, social accountability and behavioural interventions addressing petty 
corruption. 
Top-down interventions refer to those that aim to reduce the opportunity space for engaging in corrupt 
actions by addressing the incentives of public officers via changes to their contractual stipulations and 
promoting better controls at the workplace. The term top-down refers to the fact that this type of 
intervention aims to support the ability of management (and ultimately political leaders) to hold public 
sector workers accountable.  
Social accountability interventions are those involving direct citizen engagement. The World Bank 
defines social accountability as “the broad range of actions and mechanisms beyond voting that 
citizens can use to hold the state to account, as well as actions on the part of government, civil society, 
media and other societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts’ (World Bank 2006, p.5). This 
type of intervention typically seeks to strengthen formal accountability channels by means of mobilising 
citizens and civil society organisations (CSOs).  
In most cases, social accountability programmes involve some type of awareness raising and/or 
capacity building activities aimed at disseminating information about citizens’ rights and entitlements. 
The assumption is that access to the right information will enable citizens to better identify, resist and 
denounce instances of abuse of power. Sometimes capacity building activities take the form of 
specialised trainings to empower citizens to exercise their voice and engage proactively in specific 
activities. Thus, the spectrum of activities considered under the broad term social accountability goes 
from those emphasising education and awareness raising to those involving participatory actions 
whereby citizens provide inputs conducive to demand accountability and denounce corruption. There 
are many different modalities of citizen participation but the majority involve some form of performance 
monitoring of public service delivery (Molina et al., 2013; Baez-Camargo, 2015).  
It follows that social accountability interventions may be classified as a) information campaigns, b) 
community monitoring interventions or c) a combination of the former two. It is also useful to make a 
distinction between direct control interventions, where ownership is promoted by empowering 
participants to make decisions about programme content and/or implementation, and indirect control 
interventions, where citizens participate in programs that have been designed and managed by other 
(external) actors and therefore have no direct decision making powers (Banerjee et al., 2008).  
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Both the top-down and the social accountability interventions are modelled after a principal-agent 
model of accountability relations. This implies an underlying assumption on the causes of corruption, 
namely that it stems from a classical principal-agent problem arising when the two parties have 
different interests and asymmetric information. Social accountability interventions are therefore non-
behavioural because they are based on assumptions of rational decision-making by individuals who 
consistently aim at maximising their own interest and therefore respond rationally to changes in their 
incentive structures.  
In contrast, behavioural interventions are grounded in the acknowledgement that behaviour is often 
shaped by non-rational and quasi-rational factors such as in-built mental shortcuts, default solutions to 
problems and social and cultural expectations of acceptability. Individuals may be enculturated as a 
direct result of past experiences and the long-term exposure to a given and context-specific social 
environment and culture. Therefore, behavioural interventions, rather than directly targeting the 
incentives of individuals, aim at making changes in the wider environment in which people make 
decisions and respond to cues. Examples of behavioural interventions include approaches such as 
media and education campaigns aimed at changing mental models, social norms and changing the 
channels or the format in which information is communicated. 
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3 Behavioural drivers of petty 
corruption  
This section summarises the findings aimed addressing review question 1: 
What behavioural factors having an impact on individual attitudes towards petty corruption have been 
identified in the literature? 
Certainly numerous factors have been identified as being associated to prevalence of corrupt 
behaviours in general and petty corruption in particular. Because the literature on the topic is abundant 
and because the focus of this review is on the behavioural underpinnings of corrupt practices, the main 
explanatory factors that have been conventionally associated with the prevalence of corruption are here 
only very briefly summarised in the manner of background to the review exploring the behavioural 
determinants of attitudes towards petty corruption.  
Mainstream theories of corruption point to the importance of economic and political factors such as the 
level of economic development, the type of political system, the quality of institutions, the size of 
government and degree of its decentralisation, the relative level of salaries in the public sector, and the 
country’s openness to trade. (see literature surveys by (Treisman, 2007; Lambsdorff, 2007; Pellegrini 
and Gerlagh, 2008). Indeed, a significant body of empirical evidence, stemming mostly from 
quantitative analyses, consistently finds a strong association between corruption and low economic 
performance (Mauro, 1995; Gatti, Paternostro, and Rigolini 2003). Thus, in developing countries, 
corruption has often been explained as a market clearing mechanism responding to an insufficient 
supply of retail public services such as education and health care (Peiffer and Rose 2014). In particular, 
among explanations based on economic factors, low salaries have been identified as critically important 
to explain high levels of petty corruption. In fact, although the majority of the sources included in this 
review focus on factors other than conventional economic incentives, due recognition of the 
importance of low salaries is given in several of the appraised studies covering very diverse 
geographical regions including Africa (de Sardan, 1999; Agbiboa, 2015; Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002), 
Asia (Meagher, Upadhyaya, and Wilkinson, 1999;Quah, 2006) and the post-Soviet states (Grodeland et 
al. 1998).  
In terms of the political-institutional factors, big bureaucracies have been often associated with high 
corruption levels (Mauro 2004) as are weak or inadequate legal frameworks and institutions  (Brogden 
and Nijhar, 1998; Johnston, 2005) and weak monitoring (Olken, 2007). Corruption has also been 
associated with regime type whereby democracies consistently perform significantly better in control of 
corruption measures as compared to authoritarian regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Some 
authors link this finding to particular features of democratic regimes such as freedom of the press, 
which has also been found to strongly correlate with indices of corruption (Rose-Ackerman and Soreide, 
2011). Macro-level structural factors such as abundance of natural resources have also been 
associated with high levels of corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999). 
What is perhaps more relevant to underscore in taking stock of the findings contributed by this body of 
literature is that a significant part rests on assumptions of rational decision making, most conspicuously 
on the basis of the principal agent model of accountability relations. Indicative of this is one of the most 
prominent formulations contributed by Robert Klitgaard, (1988), which conceptualises corruption as 
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equalling monopoly, plus discretion minus accountability. Because this understanding of corruption has 
strongly influenced the development of the mainstream anti-corruption paradigm, it is therefore no 
surprise that most conventional anticorruption prescriptions have also often been formulated on the 
basis of such assumptions.  However, as mentioned earlier, conventional anti-corruption interventions 
have not as yet delivered the results expected in many countries (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Marquette and 
Peiffer, 2015).  
With this situation as the backdrop, the following review of the literature on behavioural determinants of 
corrupt behaviours and associated attitudes is intended to contribute to lay the groundwork to the 
development of a new generation of anti-corruption strategies that, by building on empirically derived 
and well contextualised insights, will be an effective complement to current approaches. The review 
followed a Grounded Theory-based Review (GTR) methodology in order to facilitate concept and theory 
building, which is especially important given the scarcity of studies explicitly exploring the links between 
behavioural factors of human decision making and anti-corruption outcomes. In what follows, the most 
salient points coming out of the literature review are organised along the three behavioural dimensions 
proposed by the 2015 WDR. 
3.1 Automatic thinking  
The first of the three principles emphasised by the 2015 WDR postulates that people make most 
judgments and most choices automatically. This so-called automatic thinking has been found to have a 
significant impact on attitudes towards petty corruption. As Blundo and de Sardan (2006: 5) noted 
“(e)veryday corruption is a social activity, which is regulated de facto by a series of tacit codes and 
practical norms [...which] are never explicit and are often even unconscious and automatic.”  
3.1.1 ‘Everybody is doing it’: the power of frames 
One of the modalities in which automatic thinking takes over the rational mind is through the power of 
frames, whereby our choices and behaviours are affected by the perceptions of the generalised 
patterns of action adopted by others around us. A frequent scenario discussed in the literature is that, 
when people assume that everyone else around them is paying bribes and accepting that as a normal 
state of affairs, then corruption will indeed become normalised. Generalised corruption then becomes 
the narrow frame4 shaping the reactions of individuals who, when faced with a public official, will 
immediately assume the person in front of them is expecting a bribe. Similar considerations also apply 
to providers of public services with the result that such a shared expectation overrides any ethical 
objections that individuals may have about engaging in corrupt practices, thus providing an explanation 
to instances of intention/action divide where people may emphatically condemn corrupt acts while still 
engaging in them.5  
This type of scenario has been empirically validated by a wealth of studies across several disciplines 
and utilising different methodological approaches (Kahan, 2003; Mauro, 2004; Dong et al., 2009; Barr 
and Serra, 2009; Kotzian, 2011; Carson, 2013; Peiffer and Rose, 2014; Zaloznaya, 2014; Lindner, 
2014). Overall, this literature supports the importance of automatic thinking in settings where individual 
behaviours are guided, not by rational decision-making, but by emotionally nuanced perceptions of 
reciprocity stemming from what are perceived to be the modal patterns of behaviour. 
                                                      
4 Narrow frames refer to the reference to which the automatic system of the mind refers to evaluate a situation or that which “automatically 
comes to mind” WDR (2015, p. 6). 
5 For instance, (Peiffer and Rose, 2014) reported that among Afrobarometer respondents who think bribery is wrong, 25% say they have paid a 
bribe in the past year. Since those thinking bribery is wrong and should be punished are a big majority of respondents, the upshot is that more 
than three-quarters of those who report the payment of a bribe are people who think bribery is wrong and should be punished. 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 13 
An example of how narrow frames can override learned concepts comes from the study from Barr and 
Serra (2009) who tested the impact of education on values of integrity and professionalism among 
Ethiopian nursing students and found that increased exposure to the actual experience of prevailing 
high levels of corruption in the Ethiopian health sector led to the erosion of said norms among the 
students. Along similar lines, testing for the importance of reciprocity, Kahan (2003) found that the 
perception of others’ corrupt behaviour induced individuals to be corrupt themselves out of pride, 
resentment and even revenge, whereas perceived integrity of others induced individuals to behave in a 
similar fashion out of feelings of honour and altruism. 
3.1.2 The relevance of information 
Another line of inquiry, which is also consistent with the notion of automatic thinking, explores how 
corrupt behaviours are affected by the type of information available to individuals and the manner in 
which it is interpreted, with problems of incomplete information and biases in assessing the information 
playing a significant role.  
Findings about failures to correctly account for the risks of engaging in corruption lend support to the 
behavioural thesis that very often individuals do not process the information available to them according 
to a rational actor paradigm. In an experimental setting, Djawadi and Fahr (2013) showed that 
individuals that engage in corrupt actions tend to systematically underestimate the probability of being 
caught. A plausible policy implication from such findings is that the type of information relative to the 
prosecution of corruption crimes that is communicated as well as the channels through which it is 
conveyed might have a strong impact on how it is processed by individuals. According to one study 
(Carson, 2013, p. 23) legal commands stated as clear rules that specify duties and responsibilities are 
best suited to deter corruption. Others argue that greater availability of information concerning the 
incidence of corrupt transactions can act as a deterrent because it increases the perception about the 
likelihood that corrupt officials are exposed and punished (Peisakhin and Pinto, 2010; Peisakhin, 2012). 
Also, information about the method and frequency of sanction enforcement may increase the perceived 
costs of engaging in corrupt behaviours by raising the visibility and profile of enforcing institutions, such 
as the police, legal authorities, watchdogs and other potential law enforcers (Carson, 2014). Finally, 
information about salaries of public officials may increase the willingness of citizens to denounce 
corruption (Barr and Serra, 2009) and motivate monitors to put more effort into exposing 
underperformance by public servants receiving higher wages (Abbink, 2004).6  
Also important is by whom information is disseminated and the perceived authority, trustworthiness and 
legitimacy of the messenger (Dolan et al., 2010). For instance, Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga (2016) 
found that a high level of trust in civil society organisations in Tanzania was an important factor in 
determining the effectiveness of a community training intervention carried out by a local CSO, which 
provided health service users with the information required to identify and resist petty corruption in the 
health sector.  
3.1.3 Environmental cues and automatic responses 
Environmental cues, understood as unspoken signals that trigger certain behaviours, may be important 
in eliciting corrupt behaviours, such as a corrupt official subtly hinting at a claimant to pay a bribe 
(Pfeiffer and Rose, 2014). These cues evoke different beliefs about corruption and may include 
                                                      
6 This points to the importance of the concept of distributive fairness the perception of which significantly affects behavioural responses to 
petty corruption (Abbink, 2004; Abbink et al., 2014). 
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observed behaviours of others, gossip and hearsay, traditional and religious principles (Zaloznaya, 2014) 
but also particular features of the material environment.  
One manifestation of the impact of environmental cues on behaviour was demonstrated in an 
experiment that revealed that compliance with an honour payment system for coffee in a university 
common room increased when images of watching eyes were hung on the nearby walls – plausibly 
eliciting among coffee drinking students the unconscious feeling of being watched (Bateson et al., 
2006). Along similar lines, and pointing to the potentially relevant policy implications of the impact of 
environmental cues, van Veldhuizen (2013) explored the relationship between salary increases and the 
prevalence of petty corruption based on evidence from experimental research. This author argues that 
increasing public officials’ wages may decrease petty corruption but only if monitoring is also improved, 
if only just slightly. This is an interesting finding because it points to a behavioural effect where 
tendencies to extract corrupt rents went down disproportionately compared with the actual 
improvements in monitoring suggesting that the mere perception about monitoring may have served as 
a deterrent to public officials. 
Summary points: Automatic thinking  
The studies considered in this section shed light on some of the impacts that automatic systems of 
decision making impinge on behaviours associated with petty corruption. Three areas stand out in this 
respect:  
• First, the prevalence of narrow frames that inform a perception that corruption is the normal 
state of affairs suggests that interventions aimed at emphasising examples of good behaviours 
could be effective at deterring petty corruption, even relative to alternative (and often costly) 
incentive schemes.  
• Second, the role of information is key. This includes biases in assessing available information, 
which can possibly account for the lack of effectiveness of formal systems of monitoring and 
sanctioning. Also relevant is the suggestion that careful consideration of the type of information 
that is made available to citizens, including the manner in which it is articulated and the 
channels through which it is communicated, can be key to decreasing the prevalence of petty 
corruption practices.  
• Third, environmental cues present in the physical settings where public services are provided 
may trigger automatic reactions affecting the willingness of users and service providers to 
engage in corrupt transactions. Although studies on this latter topic are scarcer, there are 
some notable examples of success from incorporating environmental cues to support anti-
corruption reforms such as the installation of prominently displayed monitoring cameras in 
Georgian public offices in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution (World Bank, 2012). 
3.2 Sociality: social norms and community preferences 
Sociality and social norms constitute the second behavioural principle of human decision making, which 
states that the actions of individuals are significantly influenced by their social environment. Consistent 
with this general notion, a significant body of literature confirms the expectation that corrupt behaviours 
and practices are often influenced by social preferences, social networks, social identities, and 
prevailing social norms.7 Furthermore, several of the works reviewed articulate the complex challenges 
to anti-corruption in contexts where corrupt behaviours are rarely condemned (if not outright praised) 
                                                      
7 Social norms - defined as ‘informal rules, driven by values and beliefs that govern interaction and are both shared and sustained by group 
members’ (Banuri and Eckel, 2012) - represent an embodiment of social values and principles that are held dear by communities and therefore 
upheld by precepts of morality.  
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because they are understood as being pursued in the fulfilment of values held dear in the communities 
(Jackall, 1988; Anders, 2002 and 2005). 
3.2.1 Social values and associated practices: Reciprocity and the ambivalence of gift-giving  
Reciprocity is one of the social values that appears to be strongly associated with practices of petty 
corruption. As such, it is often inherent in the language used to implicitly refer to bribery in the public 
service. In their study on the effect of cultural traits on practices of petty corruption in Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Grodeland et.al (1998) describe the language used by their 
respondents  to describe bribing in public services, such as: "'A favour for a favour”, “If you do not 
‘thank’ you should not expect further assistance”, “A service in return for a service'" (Grodeland et al. 
1998: 668). Interestingly, these formulations are strikingly similar to the definitions of petty corruption 
given by Tanzanians in the ethnographic study of Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga (2016) where corruption 
was articulated as "something for something" based on a notion of justice being founded on reciprocity.  
One associated practice is gift-giving which tends to be widespread in contexts where reciprocity is 
highly valued. In West Africa, it is practiced conspicuously and occurs equally in the direction of 
‘superiors’, ‘equals’ or ‘ inferiors ’ (De Sardan, 1999). The same is true for South Korea where a gift is 
fundamental to social practices to express congratulation, gratitude, condolence and attention (Chang 
et al., 2001).  
The idea of defining clear-cut criteria to draw the line between a gift and a bribe is controversial. On one 
extreme, based on their study of South Korea, Chang et al., (2001) have attempted to develop precise 
measures of monetary value and gift size as indicators of whether there is an ulterior intention to a gift. 
Along similar lines, Grodeland et al. (1998) outlined possible additional criteria to differentiate a gift 
from a bribe based on aspects such as the timing of the gift, the type of service-seeking interaction in 
which the gift is exchanged and whether money is involved or not.  
At the other end of the spectrum, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) strongly warn against conflating 
social norms with corrupt practices. Rather, the ethnographic literature suggests that coming up with 
clear dividing line between a gift and a bribe is virtually impossible in contexts where social interactions 
are characterised by multiple variations of actions that are similar in nature but carry ambivalent 
meanings (Ruud, 2000).  
3.2.2 Informal social networks and the obligation to the group 
Social links and informal social networks are prominent in the literature, especially that specialised on 
Africa. Seminal works include Ekeh’s exploration of the primordial public (Ekeh, 1975) and Hyden’s 
investigation on the Tanzanian economy of affection referring to informal economic transactions which 
cannot be understood outside the social relationships in which they are embedded (Hyden, 2005 
[1980]).  
Social networks include primary organisations like family, clan, village, tribe or race – which are bound 
together by affectionate ties (Anders, 2002) but may also be open and fluid to include acquaintances of 
varied nature and degree of proximity. Thus, any given individual may belong to a plethora of parallel 
and overlapping networks grounded in varying attributes of group affiliation, including neighbourliness, 
work relationships, church membership, etc. Besides their relevance in African contexts, the literature 
review reveals that such social networks are also conspicuous in other regions. Examples include the 
importance of extended family in India (Jauregui, 2014; Ruud, 2000), of the so-called ‘FAR’ networks 
(family, alumni, region) in South Korea (Chang et.al  2001), and the importance of networks of family 
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and close friends in most of Eastern Europe and Asia (Grodeland et al., 1998; Ledeneva, 1997 [for 
Russia and China]; Sneath, 2002 [for Mongolia]). 
What matters most in the definition of those social networks that are relevant to this review is that, 
regardless of the criteria for belonging, the relationships among group members are cemented by a 
strong sense of moral imperatives, including a sense of obligation towards the group in the form of a 
general duty of mutual assistance and reciprocity for favours given (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; 
de Sardan, 1999). The practices of reciprocity among members of informal networks become 
entrenched in good measure because of their functionality – as coping mechanisms necessary to 
secure basic services and meet urgent needs in contexts where state performance and quality of public 
services is often precarious. For instance, in urban Tanzania, voluntary associations operate on the 
basis of strict rules and are extremely effective in pooling resources to help members during times of 
need. As a consequence, such network-based associations enjoy much more trust than any other social 
or state institution (Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga, 2016) – pointing to the problem of lacking legitimacy 
and trustworthiness of public institutions.  
Informal social networks are strongly associated with corrupt practices to the extent that their reliance 
on reciprocity and sense of obligation seamlessly extends to those members employed in the public 
sector. Such individuals are often subject to strong pressures to respond to the demands and 
expectations of their social networks, which often include making use of their position to extract rents 
for the benefit of the group. The moral weight ascribed to these group obligations is often so strong that 
it tends to outweigh any sense of responsibility to protect public resources. This is to a large extent due 
to the fact that missing an opportunity to avail resources for the benefit of the group may have heavy 
social costs, including social shame, mockery and even dishonour.  
Therefore, the role of these network dynamics in fuelling corrupt practices is closely associated to 
locally recognised norms of sociality involving very delicate questions of status, respect, shame, guilt, 
peer pressure, reputation and other socially reinforced normative constraints (Baez-Camargo and 
Sambaiga, 2016; Dong et al., 2009; Fjeldstad et al., 2003; Fjeldstad, 2005; Gatti et al., 2003; Heilman 
and Ndumbaro, 2002; Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998). Furthermore, in contexts where unwritten social 
norms are strictly enforced and constitute a more binding normative framework than the formal legal 
framework, tackling corruption becomes highly probelmatic given that the distinction between public 
and private becomes not only blurred but unsuitable (Anders, 2002, 2005; Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan, 2006; de Sardan, 1999; Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002; Osei-Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie, 2000). 
3.2.3 The contradictions of social capital and the social accountability approach 
The literature on informal social networks mentioned above stands in tension to another important body 
of literature on the presumed impact of sociality on development outcomes, namely the literature on 
social capital. As Rotondi and Stanca (2015) noted, this body of literature has generated contradictory 
predictions particularly with regard to the manner in which social capital relates to corruption.  
On the one hand, higher levels of social capital are said to lead to a reduced opportunity space for 
corruption (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995) with high levels of interpersonal trust reducing corruption 
(Bjørnskov, 2010; Uslaner, 2008). On the other hand, social capital can be associated with high levels 
of corruption because social network affiliation reduces informational asymmetries, favouring collusive 
behaviour while conveying a sense of impunity (Putnam, 2000). Similarly, strong ties, family orientations 
and particularised trust have all been associated with high levels of corruption (Harris, 2007). Against 
this backdrop the literature on informal networks in Africa stands out insofar as it shows that higher 
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levels of social capital can actually exacerbate corrupt behaviour: social network affiliates are more 
likely to pay a bribe (Pfeiffer and Rose, 2014). 
Summary Points: Sociality and Social Norms 
The literature reviewed with regards to the second category of behavioural factors confirms that social 
norms and pressures are indeed highly relevant in the discussion about attitudes towards corrupt 
behaviours. In particular three topics stand out: 
• Social norms enforced by a sense of moral obligation are highly context-dependent and reflect 
the values that are dear to communities. As such, social norms will translate into a plethora of 
behaviours sharing a similar, although not explicitly articulated, rationale. In non-Western 
contexts, where the social norms may not align well with the Weberian paradigm of the state, 
the resulting ambivalence of meanings and intentions make it practically impossible to discern 
clear-cut criteria to categorise actions and decisions as either corrupt or non-corrupt.  
• Informal social networks that operate on the basis of solidarity and reciprocity are valued for 
pooling resources and solving problems. In Africa, as well as in other regions, the obligations 
towards the informal networks are closely associated with social status and reputation. Such 
group obligations tend to prevail when pitted against the formal rules of the state. As a 
consequence, the expectations from the informal groups - whereby a member holding a 
position of public office should do everything within his or her means to cater to the needs of 
the group - can fuel the incidence of corrupt actions.  
• The literature on social capital demonstrates that tight communities where high levels of trust 
and interpersonal linkages abound are associated with both positive and negative anti-
corruption outcomes. This suggests the potential of harnessing locally-esteemed values and 
norms to pursue improved governance and development goals. 
3.3 Culture and Mental models  
The third behavioural principle discussed in the 2015 WDR postulates that individuals act and think 
influenced by the mental models prevailing in their culture. Mental models refer to categories and 
stereotypes that people use to make sense of the world and to shape their views. The concept of 
mental model may be useful for understanding precisely what corruption means in a given context. 
Mental models are also relevant to the extent that they shape the roles of different societal actors on 
the basis of what those actors believe is expected of them (World Bank, 2015). As such, mental models 
are often associated to culture but more broadly understood refer to predefined concepts, categories, 
identities, prototypes, stereotypes, causal narratives and worldviews that are shared among 
communities. The literature suggests several ways in which enculturation and mental models play role 
in shaping corrupt behaviour. 
3.3.1 Evidence of the impact of cultural traits on corrupt behaviours 
At a general level, a significant number of studies suggest that here is a link between culture and the 
predispositions towards acts of corruption of individuals (Husted, 1999; Osei-Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie, 
2000; Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002; Fisman and Miguel, 2006; Licht et al., 2006; Andaya, 2009; Jung et 
al., 2014; Agbiboa, 2015; Gächter and Schulz, 2016).  
Repeatedly quoted in the literature is the work by Husted (1999), who tested the effect of four cultural 
variables on corruption outcomes. The cultural variables included in this quantitative study were: a) 
power distance, referring to a culture of unequal power distribution and paternalism, b) individualism vs. 
collectivism, which refers to the extent to which decisions about a person’s life are determined by the 
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individual or the in-group (circle of family, friends or peers) c) masculinity vs. femininity, measuring the 
extent to which competitiveness and material success are valued over quality of life, and d) uncertainty 
avoidance, or the extent to which a society feels threatened by uncertainty. The author found that more 
unequal societies favouring a competitive pursuit for materialistic rewards and a preference for risk 
aversion are more likely to be corrupt. Several studies have followed up on this line of research, many 
investigating the role of corruption in cultures that increasingly value money, materialism and economic 
success (Agbiboa, 2015 [for Nigeria]; Andaya, 2009 [for Cuba], Osei-Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie, 2000 
[for Africa]).  
Another frequently cited study was conducted by Fisman and Miguel (2006) in which they investigated 
the influence of culture on corrupt behaviours among UN diplomats by looking at the number of traffic 
violations they committed in New York City. The authors found that diplomats from low corruption 
countries (e.g., Norway) behaved remarkably well even in situations where they could get away with 
violations, while those from high corruption countries (e.g., Nigeria) committed many violations, 
suggesting a cultural predisposition to engage in acts of corruption. Similarly, using an experimental 
approach across 23 countries, Gächter and Schulz (2016) found that individual predispositions to 
engage in rule breaking – what they refer to as intrinsic honesty- strongly correlate to the baseline level 
of such behaviours prevailing in the country of origin.   
3.3.2 Culture – an appropriate explanatory variable? Critical views 
Several other authors regard the use of culture as an explanatory variable as problematic, since culture 
may be used as a residual explanation for differences that are not explained by other factors or is 
simply regarded as an inadequate concept to be utilised in such a manner (de Sardan, 1999; Chang et. 
al, 2001; Gephart, 2009; Kapoor and Ravi, 2009; S. Banuri and Eckel, 2012; Yap 2013).  
Some studies suggest that culture is not a strong explanatory variable once other factors have been 
taken into account. For instance, Kapoor and Ravi (2009) revisited the study on parking behaviours of 
UN diplomats and found that the effect of culture on corruption became insignificant after controlling 
for quality of civil services and quality and quantity of public infrastructure in a country. Barr and Serra 
(2010) also tested the robustness of the findings of Fisman and Miguel (2006) and, although their 
findings partially support the hypothesis that individuals carry corruption norms across borders, they 
also found that the effect wanes with time, suggesting that people update their values when confronted 
with changed environments, increasingly conforming to the new norms. 
In their review of the literature on the relationship between culture and corruption, Banuri and Eckel 
(2012) concluded that, although experimental work has revealed certain patterns that support the 
association between corruption and certain cultures, more research is still needed. These authors 
suggest that corruption norms may not be intrinsic in a culture but rather incentive-driven and that one 
important area that needs to be further explored is the effect of short-term punishment. This latter 
approach is consistent with the study by Yap (2013), who found that punishment (or lack thereof) is a 
much better predictor of corrupt behaviour than any cultural difference. 
Several other positions critical of culture as an explanatory variable for corrupt behaviours come from 
the authors of qualitative studies on non-Western contexts. Focusing on the case of South Korea, 
Chang et.al (2001) criticised the very premise of researching culture and corruption saying that there 
seem to be two equally unsatisfactory perspectives on the criteria that are applied to judge whether or 
not behaviour is ethical for people of different cultures: On the one hand, there is the assumption that a 
universally applicable code of ethics is valid for all people. If this were true, then the ensuing conclusion 
would be simple: any behaviour complying with this universal code of ethics is ethical; otherwise, it is 
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not ethical. On the other hand, one can also adopt the position that any code of ethics is culture-bound, 
according to which, there is no universal or superior code of ethics.  
Jean Pierre Olivier De Sardan, who is arguably one of the most experienced ethnographers who has 
studied the roots of corrupt practices in Africa, has pointed out to factors associated to local cultures 
(such as a pre-colonial culture of ostentation), which in contemporary settings could appear to be 
associated to high levels of corruption. Nonetheless he has argued:  "Should one therefore impute 
corruption in Africa to some kind of ‘African culture’? Nothing would be more absurd. The notion of 
culture is extremely polysemic," and argues in favour of the avoidance of “both of these opposed and 
symmetrical stumbling blocks: an explanation by ‘culture’, or the denial of any ‘cultural factor’ 
whatsoever" (de Sardan, 1999: 44). 
Adopting a different line of argument on the same topic, Gephart 2009 considers the importance of 
relative meanings and normative frameworks to question the very the concept of corruption on the 
ground that it is in and of itself exceedingly specific both socially and culturally. Therefore, this author 
finds the existing anti-corruption consensus to be problematic because it fails to grasp the nuances 
about which types of corruption emerge in different contexts and, even more basically, what corruption 
actually means to different social groups.  
3.3.3 Mental models and collective imagination 
Moving away from arguments centred on culture, the power of mental models has been further studied 
in other works included in this review. One compelling example is the ethnographic work of (Foerster, 
2012) who analysed collective imaginations of statehood and social relations in West Africa. According 
to this research, which was conducted in post-conflict contexts where a functional state is absent, 
social actors repeat what they have lived and experienced before– using their mental models of what a 
‘state looks like’ and how state actors are supposed to behave - when enacting governance practices. 
In turn, the lack of mental models of the state and its bureaucracy can be problematic as argued by 
Widmalm (2005) who described an almost complete collapse of the distinction between the public and 
the private spheres in India because the state is in practice so intertwined in social relations that it is 
hard (or even impossible) to separate the two. This, the author claims, is much more relevant than 
arguments about cultural acceptability of corruption since people disapprove of corruption regardless of 
the context but may be helpless to stand up against it if they do not understand how the state is 
supposed to function in the first place. 
Shared images and ideas about social roles –including what constitutes being a ‘good’ politician, 
service provider and public official- determine how people come to expect themselves and others to 
behave in different situations (Kotzian, 2011). Thus, De Sardan (1999) has argued that in the African 
context it is common to believe that acceding to a state position confers a prebendal prerogative, 
whereby it makes absolute sense to expect that "a policeman has the right to deduct his dues from 
transporters, in the same way that a directeur de cabinet has the right to dip into special funds, or the 
customary judge the right to exact fees from oﬀenders" (De Sardan 1999: 42). Similarly, Peisakhin and 
Pinto (2010) argued that, given that graft is so deeply embedded in India, service providers do not 
regard bribery as wrong or even risky but rather as standard bureaucratic practice. Evidence of 
precisely this type of shared beliefs of certain corrupt practices as something normal has been also 
discussed by Gephart (2009) for the case of Bolivia and Meagher et al. (1999) for the case of Nepal. 
Other research shows mental models at play in shaping behaviours vis-à-vis petty corruption but in 
different ways. For instance, Miller et.al (2000) studied corruption in the health sector in four post-
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communist countries and found that doctors consistently justified taking informal payments and gifts 
from their patients  on the basis of a perception that doctors work very hard and payment of extra work 
is fair, a position reinforced by a culture that justifies gift-taking to an unusual degree. 
Sometimes the origins of mental models can be traced back a long time and therefore play a strong 
role in perpetuating collective patterns of social behaviour. For instance, Agbiboa (2015) studied the 
determinants of corrupt behaviours in the Nigerian police sector and found certain corrupt practices to 
be to a large degree the product of police officers’ behaviours mimicking the police culture under 
colonial rule. This is in line with the arguments made by Ashforth and Anand (2003) (quoted in 
Zaloznaya 2014: 10), who analyse corruption as a property of a collective that exists outside any one 
individual actor. They argue that acts of corruption become embedded and routinized in the structures 
and cultures of specific organizations. These organisationally rooted assumptions, values, and beliefs 
may then override ethical convictions that new members bring in from the outside, whereby it is 
plausible that an otherwise ethically-minded individual may forsake universalistic or dominant norms of 
ethical behaviour in favour of particularistic behaviours.  
Finally, mental models can also explain why some groups may be more vulnerable to fall prey to corrupt 
officials than others. An experiment conducted by Hall et al. (2014) among low-income individuals 
found that participants who were exposed to a self-affirmation exercise, where they recalled and 
described an event or situation that made them feel successful or proud about themselves, thereafter 
displayed greater willingness to avail themselves of benefits programs than their counterparts who were 
not exposed to the self-affirmation exercise.  
Summary points: Culture and Mental Models 
As the reviewed literature considered here suggests, the evidence on the association of corrupt 
behaviours with certain cultures is hotly contested and inconclusive. Perhaps part of the problem is that 
associating undesirable behaviours with certain cultures is considered by many to be profoundly 
problematic and even potentially dangerous. Moving away from discussions centring on culture, mental 
models have been associated with behaviours of petty corruption in several manners. The following 
points summarise the discussion: 
• There is evidence produced by several experimental and quantitative studies that suggests that 
there is a link between the culture individuals are enculturated into and their subsequent 
predispositions towards corruption. While this evidence should be taken seriously, it also seems 
clear that this is an area where further research is needed to better understand the conditions 
under which cultural background may override other variables in explaining individual choice 
and how changes in context and time impact the influence of cultural background in shaping 
attitudes towards corruption. 
• The literature that is critical to cultural explanations of corrupt behaviours raises some 
fundamental questions about the suitability of adopting an admittedly Western influenced 
analytical lens –that of the good governance paradigm – to contexts that have evolved from 
substantially different circumstances. 
• Widely held mental models can have a powerful influence over what individuals expect from the 
state but also can create strong preconceptions about social roles, defining identities and what 
are expected and acceptable behaviours associated with such identities. These collective 
images work to legitimise behaviours that may have no correlate to formal roles and legal 
mandates, thus opening the way for illicit actions to be tacitly tolerated and even accepted. 
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4 Assessment of the relative 
effectiveness of interventions against 
petty corruption  
The second review question addressed in this study asks what the literature has to say about the 
relative effectiveness of different types of interventions to address petty corruption. In order to ensure 
the necessary rigour to extract meaningful insights to respond to the review question, the analysis has 
followed the Textual Narrative Synthesis (TNS) methodology, which has been already successfully 
applied to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies (Hanna et al., 2011). The TNS 
methodology consists of a series of sequential steps through which intervention studies are clustered 
into comparable groups in order to allow for the identification of cross cutting themes, recurring 
patterns and relationships as well as moderating factors and characteristics that may account for 
variation in outcomes within groups. In a final step a meta-analysis investigates possible common 
causal relationships across groups  (Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009).  
After conducting a preliminary review of a vast number of studies and subjecting them to rigorous 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, the main part of this assessment draws from the review of 15 experimental 
studies of anti-corruption interventions.8 These studies have been categorised into six groups according 
to type of intervention, sector, type of corrupt practices that are targeted, and geographic region. All 
studies discuss interventions conducted in either Africa or India with the exception of one that 
describes an intervention that took place in Indonesia.9 The latter study has been included because it 
involves an original intervention design that directly tests the relative effectiveness of top-down versus 
bottom up anti-corruption interventions, making it a suitable complement to the discussion.  
In addition to the experimental studies discussed here, a review was also conducted of several 
observational studies of anti-corruption interventions. By virtue of their heterogeneity, these 
observational studies are less suitable for comparison. Nonetheless insights from the observational 
studies are discussed in the synthesis analysis (section 5) in light of the findings of the TNS review.  
The intervention groups that have been considered for the TNS review of interventions addressing petty 






                                                      
8 Experimental studies are highlighted because they provide a high degree of internal validity as compared to observational studies and are 
therefore more suited to produce clear and reliable findings (Hanna et al. 2011, p. 22). 
9 Drawing upon (Pandey et al., 2007) and  (Chen and Ravallion, 2004) the assumption is made that the most important socio-demographic 
conditions prevailing in rural India and Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently similar to allow valid comparison. 
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India 3 (1) Pandey et al. (2007) 
(2) Pandey et al. (2008) 






Africa 3 (4) Björkman and 
Svensson (2009) 
(5) Duflo et al. (2012) 






Africa 3 (7) Reinikka/Svensson, 
(2004, 2009,2011)  
(8) Keefer and Khemani, 
(2011) 








3 (10) Fujiwara/Wantchekon, 
(2013) 
(11) Banerjee et al.  (2010) 
(12) Vicente (2014)  





India 2 (13) Peisakhin/Pinto 
(2010) 
(14) Peisakhin (2012) 
6 Mixed (top-down 
and bottom-up 
intervention) 
Infrastructure Indonesia 1 (15) Olken (2007) 
 
4.1 Group 1: Social-accountability anti-corruption interventions in the health and education 
sectors (India) 
4.1.1 Description of the studies and results 
Starting with the Indian studies, Pandey et al (2007, 2008a) studied the effects of social accountability 
initiatives aimed at informing rural populations about their rights and entitlements regarding health and 
education in several Indian states (Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh), where public service 
delivery is inadequate and high levels of absenteeism and other malpractices of petty corruption prevail. 
The studies tested the impact of one social accountability campaign based solely on information against 
the impact of a similar campaign that additionally included an advocacy component motivating people 
to take concrete actions. The hypothesis tested was that informed and empowered citizens are less 
likely to tolerate petty corruption.  
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The information-only campaign consisted of two rounds public meetings in selected villages informing 
citizens about their rights and entitlements when accessing public health and education services. The 
meetings were complemented with the distribution of informative materials, such as posters and 
leaflets. A survey assessment conducted after one year revealed significant improvements of service 
delivery measured by an increase in the number of nurse visits, prenatal examinations and tetanus 
vaccinations, as well as a decrease in excess school fees charged and more village council meetings 
convened.10  
Notwithstanding the overall positive result, the study also shed light into important challenges to the 
exercise of social accountability in these communities. The most notable challenge referred to the 
disempowering impact of social cleavages and power asymmetries in the community. While the 
frequency of village council meetings significantly increased after the intervention, according to 
participants service delivery-related issues were rarely taken up in such meetings out of a mix of fear 
and a ‘sense of futility’.  The common perception was that village heads tended to be unapproachable 
and to unduly favour the particular interests of members of their own caste.  
The second intervention added a participatory component - in the form of advocacy for community 
monitoring - to the information campaign. Data from follow-up surveys indicated significant impact as 
registered by indicators such as teacher effort, but only modest effects on learning outcomes. However, 
a strikingly positive result in the communities that received the advocacy component was more efficient 
delivery of entitled benefits overcoming caste differences, whereas in the communities that received 
the information-only component entitlements were more likely to be redistributed within the caste to 
which the decision maker belonged.  
The third social accountability study in this group was implemented in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, 
which was also included in the previous studies of Pandey et al (2007, 2008a) described above. The 
researchers (Banerjee et al., 2008) implemented three types of interventions aimed at encouraging and 
promoting community and beneficiary participation in education. The programmes were implemented 
by Village Education Committees (VECs), which consist of 3 parents, the head teacher and the head of 
village government.  
The first intervention was an indirect control, information-only campaign that disseminated material 
describing school norms, rights and entitlements.  
The second intervention added a participatory component to the information campaign. In this 
intervention participants created learning report cards intended to help parents to monitor their 
children’s school performance.  
The third treatment added yet another component to the intervention design by providing training in 
simple tutoring activities to small groups of local volunteers, who were subsequently expected to offer 
voluntary ‘reading classes’. 
The assessment conducted by the authors revealed that the first two interventions did not have any 
impact, even though villagers mobilised and attended the village meetings. Only the third intervention 
generated significant mobilisation on the part of the trained volunteers, which translated into significant 
improvements in learning outcomes of the students who received the tutoring. However, none of the 
three interventions had any measureable effect on large-group behaviours to demand accountability 
from local service providers.  
                                                      
10 A follow-up focus group discussion after two years further confirmed these improvements. 




Among all intervention studies reviewed, those in this first group are among those with highest level of 
comparability because of almost identical intervention design implemented in same geographic context. 
Thus, it is important to discuss plausible explanations for the differing results from these studies, which 
are summarised in Figure 1. 
 
From a methodological viewpoint, it appears that differences in sample selection may have been 
relevant. While Pandey et al (2007, 2008) took care to account for socio-demographic characteristics 
of the target population (making a distinction between low caste and middle and high caste households) 
Banerjee et al. (2008) did not.11  The authors in the latter study only stated that the majority of villages 
where the interventions took place were illiterate, which would suggest that most village participants 
belonged to a low-caste. Notably, the body implementing the unsuccessful interventions (the VEC) 
included the head of the village government, which points to the problematic impact of social 
stratification and status on the effectiveness of the interventions.  
Local power asymmetries could also explain why the smaller-sized, direct control intervention involving 
village volunteers was successful in mobilising tutoring activities since these took place outside the 
sphere of influence of village council members who could potentially discriminate against them on the 
basis of their caste. Furthermore, this explanation is consistent with the findings of the Pandey et.al, 
(2007, 2008) studies, which revealed the problematic nature of power disparities for social 
accountability to the extent that they can lead to elite capture and contribute to feelings of 
disempowerment and scepticism among the excluded.  
                                                      
11 Banerjee (et al. 2008) only randomly select 65 treatment villages out of 280 villages, whereas Pandey et al. (2007, et al. 2008) use 
clustered samples at the village level. Banerjee’s chosen simple random sampling method potentially decreased sample variation whereas by 
resorting to cluster sampling, Pandey et al. made sure that both low and middle-to-high caste households were covered more or less equally. 
Figure 1: Group 1 Social-accountability anti-corruption interventions in the health and education sectors 
(India) 
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4.2 Group 2: Social-accountability anti-corruption interventions in the health and education 
sectors (Africa) 
4.2.1 Description of the studies and results 
The first intervention in this group was conducted by Björkman and Svenssøn (2009). It addressed 
common problems of petty corruption in 50 public health care dispensaries in rural Uganda, including 
absenteeism and the leakage of medical supplies and drugs. The campaign, which was implemented by 
local NGOs, involved a community scorecard (CSC) exercise containing both an information and a 
participatory component. The CSC approach encourages community members to identify key problems 
with health services making use of a scorecard instrument. Subsequently, meetings are organised in 
which community members and service providers can discuss the state of health care services and 
feasible steps for improvement.  
The evidence suggests that the communities that were exposed to the CSC programme became more 
involved in monitoring, instances of corruption decreased in frequency and user utilisation and quality 
of service outcomes improved. Notably, citizens became more active in monitoring those issues which 
they themselves had identified and discussed with each other as opposed to issues presented to them 
by village heads. 
The second African intervention was studied by Björkman-Nyqvist et al (2014), who evaluated whether 
providing key information on performance had an effect on intervention effectiveness. The authors 
wanted to test the proposition that with access to the right type of information, users would be better 
able to distinguish between actions that hinge on health workers’ choices -and would therefore be 
susceptible to accountability demands - from other factors beyond health workers’ control. To test this 
idea, two types of interventions were designed and implemented in 75 Ugandan communities.  
The first was a participatory intervention where health workers, service users and community members 
identified and talked about issues of key relevance to the performance of health services in an open 
discussion format.  
In the second intervention, report cards were distributed at the beginning of each meeting with the 
performance data of health care providers that included comparative data of other facilities as well as 
national standards.  
The results showed that the first, purely participatory, intervention had little impact. When there was no 
performance information from outside sources available, service providers and facility managers tended 
to significantly misrepresent and underreport performance problems and issues, such as absenteeism 
and waiting times. When asked to list the most important factors impeding adequate availability of 
health services the health workers often mentioned insufficient availability of funds, staff, medical 
materials and drugs – all problems outside the health workers’ control. Issues such as corrupt practices 
(absenteeism, leakage of supplies) or bad performance (shirking, mistreatment of patience) were rarely 
verbalised.   
In contrast, the participation and information campaign resulted in far more engaged communities and 
long-lasting effects in both health provision and health outcomes. In fact, as expected, the information 
helped users to identify those service shortcomings associated with health workers’ efforts, which in 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 26 
turn empowered them to better monitor performance, contributing to improved long-term health 
outcomes.12 
The final study in this group was conducted by Duflo et al. (2012), who tested for the effectiveness of a 
programme applied in selected Kenyan schools suffering from poor performance associated with high 
student-teacher ratios, high teacher absenteeism, favouritism in hiring of human resources and capture 
by local elites. The intervention, known as the Extra Teacher Programme (ETP), sought to improve 
school underperformance by targeting three areas: a) shortages of teachers were addressed by 
contracting additional teachers, who were hired and managed locally, b) incentives for the new teachers 
were targeted through short term contracts with conditional performance-based renewal, and c) school 
governance reforms were implemented by the creation of oversight school committees. These 
committees were composed of parents who received training on how to interview prospective teachers, 
how to monitor teachers’ effort level and performance, and how to conduct a formal performance 
review conducive to contract renewal.  
The study tested for effects on teacher performance and children’s learning outcomes measured by test 
scores. Students were randomly assigned into classes taught either by the newly contracted teachers 
and governed by the school parents’ committee, or classes taught by regular civil service instructors 
with a significant lower pupil teacher ratio.  
The authors found little improvement in test scores of students taught by regular civil service teachers 
despite the significant decrease in student-teacher ratio. In contrast, the test scores of students taught 
by locally contracted, managed and monitored teachers increased by almost 30%. Additionally, teachers 
contracted under the pilot scheme were better motivated and incentivised as suggested by their 
significantly lower absence rate.   
These findings suggest that weak governance institutions and teachers’ incentive structures play a 
considerable role in explaining underperformance. In fact, civil service teachers, who had no contractual 
changes and were not monitored by parents’ committees, were even more likely to be absent if their 
school received extra funding to hire additional teachers. Perhaps even more strikingly, some civil 
service teachers even tried to take advantage of the increased resources to favour their relatives to be 
contracted to the new teaching positions, which suggests the importance of exogenous factors, such as 
pressure from social networks, on the propensity to engage in corrupt actions. However, the findings 
suggest that proper governance mechanisms of monitoring linked to performance-based contracts 
incentives can significantly decrease the incidence of corrupt practices and improve learning outcomes. 
In the study, monitoring on the part of the oversight school committees improved teacher efforts (even 
of those employed under regular civil service contracts) and the proportion of hired contract teachers 
who are also relatives of regular civil service teachers was cut in half.  
  
                                                      
12 A key strength of this study was the long time horizon of three years (2004-2007) allowing to measure long lasting effects at the impact 
level. 
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4.2.2 Discussion  
Figure 2 summarises the interventions reviewed in this group and their outcomes. 
 
The three African social accountability studies demonstrate the importance of information. The findings 
of Björkman-Nyqvist et al. (2014) confirmed the relevance of sharing the right content to enable 
citizens to demand accountability. The study by Björkman and Svensson (2009) outlined the 
importance of ownership by showing the positive impact when citizens themselves compile the 
information to evaluate public services. Furthermore, these two studies show how access to the right 
kind of information helped to identify locally manageable issues and feasible solutions to those 
problems. The findings by Duflo et al. (2012) highlighted how empowerment of parents with the 
information required to effectively monitor and evaluate the performance of school teachers was 
instrumental to the successful enforcement of an incentive structure that deterred teachers from 
engaging in corrupt practices. 
The study by Duflo also shows how anti-corruption interventions can generate unintended negative 
consequences when the incentives of service providers are not adequately aligned. In this case, 
teachers whose financial and career incentives were not addressed took advantage of the rent 
extracting opportunities that the ETP brought along.  
4.3 Group 3: Educational campaigns in health and education (Africa) 
4.3.1 Description of the studies and results 
The third group of studies deals with educational campaigns aimed at improving outcomes in the health 
and education sectors (Reinikka and Svenssøn 2004, 2009 and 2011, Keefer and Khemani 2011, and 
Keefer and Khemani 2014).  
The first intervention was a newspaper campaign of broad regional coverage initiated by the Ugandan 
government in 1995, which has been discussed in a series of studies by Reinikka and Svenssøn (2004, 
2009 and 2011). The campaign informed parents about expenditure data of centrally distributed funds 
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to schools in rural areas. It also provided communities with information about ways to monitor local 
officials’ handling of public funds.  
The intervention produced remarkable positive results. The public schools in question effectively 
received more than 80% of their official grants and entitlements in 2001 as compared to an average 
24% in 1995, a significant reduction in the capture of public funds. The improved availability of funds for 
education was furthermore accompanied by a steady increase in student enrolment rates and positive, 
albeit weaker, effects on student learning outcomes. The authors (2004) have explained the decrease in 
resource leakages by suggesting that as the community became better informed it increased its 
monitoring capabilities, although it is not clear whether the monitoring actually took place or not.  
The authors also propose (2009) two plausible explanations for the observed increase in enrolment 
rates: (1) the increased availability of funds reduces the cost burden for parents which in turn leads 
more families to enrol their children, or (2) the increased availability of funds improves the overall 
quality of education which in turn raises the value of investing in education.  
The second educational campaign (Keefer and Khemani 2011) was also originally conceptualised as an 
information-only social accountability programme aimed at promoting quality of education and better 
school performance. This intervention delivered educational programmes through community 
broadcasting to 210 villages in predominantly poor, rural and sparsely populated areas of Northern 
Benin, where government accountability structures are generally weaker. Northern Benin possesses a 
vibrant network of local community radios, which are often the only source of news coverage for local 
households, and it was hoped that educational broadcast programmes would promote public interest in 
education and elicit an increase in citizens’ demand for more accountable health and education 
services.  
The findings revealed significantly higher literacy rates among children living in areas receiving the 
educational broadcasts but, surprisingly, the radio campaign did not trigger the expected mobilisation 
to demand accountability on the part of parents. Rather, the analysis indicated that educational 
programming impacted the private behaviours of parents who, following exposure to the educational 
programmes, started to buy more books and became more willing to pay tuitions.  
In fact, a closer look at the content of the educational programmes revealed that the community 
broadcasting did not disseminate information about rights, norms and entitlements, nor about the 
performance of public institutions and service providers. Rather, it conveyed powerful messages about 
the overall value and importance of education. The background to this intervention was a recent 
government reform that increased funds for public education, which had raised already the saliency of 
education as an issue in the country. Therefore, the community broadcasting appears to have worked to 
frame the issue further, contributing to sensitising and convincing listeners about the value and utmost 
importance of education, which translated into a greater willingness to invest in children’s education.  
The third study (Keefer and Khemani 2014) measured the indirect effects of the same community 
broadcasting campaign described above (Keefer and Khemani 2011) on attitudes towards political 
patronage, including practices of gift-giving.13 The findings revealed that respondents from villages with 
greater access to educational programming, notwithstanding its non-political content, were significantly 
less likely to support patronage jobs for a few that came at the expense of decreased spending in 
public education.  
                                                      
13 Although the measured outcomes consist of behaviours associated with political corruption, this study has been categorised in group 3 
because the intervention in question involved information about the value of education. 
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The analysis of the findings of this third intervention suggested that, by increasing citizen demand for 
improved service delivery, the educational broadcasting had also re-shaped individual preferences 
towards clientelist practices that negatively affect the quality of education services. In the authors’ 
view, by underscoring the value of education, the radio broadcasts appealed to values of parental 
responsibility towards children, which in turn influenced political preferences. Thus, community 
broadcasting presumably contributed to framing an issue, raising its salience and ultimately persuading 
individuals to adopt new behaviours consistent with the new information.  
However, notwithstanding the positive results reported above, Keefer and Khemani (2014) also reported 
some ambivalence in the attitudes of citizens exposed to the educational campaign towards other types 
of patronage practices, namely those associated with gift-giving. In a survey conducted by the authors, 
70% of respondents believed that clientelist politicians are corrupt, but half of them still thought that 
clientelist candidates are more effective in delivering health and education outcomes than are non-
clientelist candidates (Keefer/Khemani 2014: 28). Interestingly, the authors also found that households 
with more children were more likely to favour clientelist candidates, perhaps because they were 
investing more of their private resources in their children’s health and education, and thus might regard 
patronage gifts as supplementary income.  
4.3.2 Discussion 
Figure 3 summarises the interventions reviewed in this group and their outcomes. 
 
These studies involved information-only social accountability interventions where the expectation was 
that making information available would trigger increased citizen engagement to monitor services and 
demand accountability of teachers and school management. Of the three studies two reported positive 
impact while the third had mixed results. What is most relevant to underscore with regard to these 
studies, is that the positive outcomes were not associated with the mobilization of citizens to make use 
of the information to demand accountability of the local authorities and service providers. Rather, the 
responses to the education campaigns can be characterised as behavioural in nature.  
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In the first study by Reinikka and Svenssøn (2004, 2009 and 2011), the newspaper campaign, which 
instructed communities how to monitor the execution of public funds for schools, achieved remarkable 
results in decreasing budget leakages even when it was not clear that the communities in question 
actually mobilised to conduct monitoring activities. This suggests the possibility of a strong deterrent 
impact of increased perceptions of being monitored on the part of public officials, who become less 
likely to embezzle funds as a consequence. Also, the awareness about availability of public funds for 
education led parents to enrol their children in school more than had been the case before. 
The intervention that made use of community radio programmes to raise awareness about the value of 
education had a direct positive impact on the parents’ decisions regarding investment in the education 
of their children (Keefer/Khemani 2011). By stressing the importance of education for improving the 
future livelihood of children, the campaign presumably appealed to values of parental love and 
responsibility, which in turn changed the way in which parents framed their spending decisions.  
Furthermore, the study probing for the impact of the education campaign on attitudes towards political 
corruption (Keefer/Khemani 2014) sheds important insights about how some mental models may 
remain entrenched even when others change. The increased value given to education did decrease 
support for clientelistic practices that could affect quality of education (such as appointing unqualified 
political patrons to jobs in the education sector). However, support for politicians who appeal for voter 
support on the basis of vote buying (“gift-giving”) did not decrease, highlighting the persistence of 
ambivalent attitudes towards corrupt practices. 
4.4 Educational campaigns against political corruption (Africa and India) 
Group number four consists of three interventions focusing on political corruption, namely clientelism, 
patronage and vote buying.  
4.4.1 Description of the studies 
The study by Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) analyses the electoral effects of a clean political 
campaign on the prevalence of clientelism and voter turnout in Benin during the 2006 presidential 
election. Instead of organising the usual clientelist campaign rallies where votes are garnered through 
gift-giving and the promise of favours and patronage, four leading presidential candidates cooperated in 
the experiment and agreed to a non-clientelistic campaign strategy in randomly assigned villages. The 
campaign was based on candidate-endorsed hall meetings where specific policy platforms were 
discussed and voters were given a chance to deliberate.  
The campaign reduced self-reported measures of clientelism, and did not affect voter turnout. However, 
in the regions considered political strongholds of the candidates, voter turnout decreased and the 
candidates in fact lost votes when they conducted a non-clientelistic campaign.  
A second study by Banerjee and team (Banerjee et al., 2010) consists of a randomised field experiment 
in India where two types of non-partisan voter mobilisation campaigns where conducted in the state of 
Uttar Pradesh during the 2007 local elections. The first campaign was intended to prime citizens 
against voting along ethnic lines or for candidates of their own caste. The second campaign primed 
citizens against voting for corrupt candidates with a criminal record. Both campaigns were designed 
and implemented by local NGOs and consisted of visits to villages to deliver the messages by means of 
meetings, posters and a puppet show.  
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The analysis of the outcomes revealed mixed results: While the anti-corruption campaign had no effect 
on either voter registration, electoral outcome or overall turnout, the caste campaign did have a positive 
effect on electoral behaviour – with a 10% drop in caste voting in the treatment villages.  
The third study in this sub-group (Vicente, 2007) focuses on the effects of a non-partisan voter 
education campaign on vote buying practices in Sao Tome and Principe conducted during the 2006 
presidential election. The campaign consisted of a leaflet distributed, read and discussed door-to-door. 
In terms of content, the campaign contained two appeals: a message stressing the illegality of vote 
buying and a behavioural appeal to morality, good ethics and one’s better nature calling for one’s vote 
to be casted with ‘good conscience’.  
The results from this campaign were mixed. On the one hand, reported perceptions of vote buying 
decreased and there were also increased perceptions that voting was exercised in “good conscience”. 
However, overall voter turnout decreased and no there was no observable increase in citizen actions 
demanding accountability in the conduct of electoral campaign practices. 
4.4.2 Discussion  
Figure 4 summarises the interventions reviewed in this group and their outcomes. 
 
The analysis of these three information campaigns to tackle political corruption sheds light into relevant 
behavioural factors that are likely behind some of the negative outcomes observed, such as decreased 
voting for non-corrupt candidates and lack of impact of campaign appeals to reject corrupt practices 
such as vote buying.  
In their study, Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) showed that in some contexts candidates who shift 
from clientelistic to clean electoral campaigns may suffer electoral losses. This finding has several 
implications. First, it underscores the power of clientelist practices and how these are fuelled by the 
expectations of receiving particularistic benefits on the part of the social groups supporting the 
candidates. Secondly, the findings suggest how voter preferences may be reinforced by risk averse 
dispositions and short-term benefit calculations. This would be the case when individuals give greater 
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consideration to short-term losses (loss of the patronage resource) even when longer-term gains may 
be of considerably larger magnitude (better quality of essential public services). Finally, the experiment 
shows how from the perspective of political elites the incentives are aligned against running clean 
electoral campaigns.  
It is meanigful that the successful (anti-caste) voting campaign in the study by Banerjee et al. (2010) 
emphasised in its message the importance of voting for well-prepared politicians to foster development, 
which led to changes in voting behaviour by undercutting an influential decision heuristic to vote 
automatically in favour of one’s caste, and shifting the focus to information on the importance of quality 
of policy for development. The anti-corruption campaign, however, failed in its formulation to weaken 
the heuristic of voting for candidates when they have a corrupt record, perhaps due to lack of adequate 
framing of the anti-corruption message in terms of the costs to citizens’ welfare and development that 
corrupt behaviours generate.  
Finally, the outcomes from the information campaign described by Vicente (2013) point to behavioural 
challenges stemming from an intention/action divide whereas people reported improved perceptions of 
voting in “good conscience”, voting turnout actually decreased and there was no measureable increase 
in political engagement to demand accountability. The findings yielded by this and other interventions 
reviewed so far could confirm the assumption that appeals based on legal, moral and fairness principles 
may not suffice to change attitudes about the value of political accountability without presenting some 
performance data or making a compelling case about the ways in which corruption hurts the wellbeing 
of individuals and their families.  
4.5 Right to information interventions (India) 
4.5.1 Description of the studies and results 
This group comprises two experimental studies that focus on an information campaign targeting bribery 
in the Indian public sector. It should be noted that the interventions included in this group are not 
conventional social accountability interventions. Thus, rather than focusing on citizen engagement and 
mobilisation these interventions have sought find out the effectiveness of a legal approach available to 
citizens – filing a Right To Information (RTI) request - compared to other strategies for incentivising 
better performance of public officials. Therefore, these interventions may better be characterised as 
top-down.  
Concretely, the two studies in this group tested the effects of India’s Right to Information Act (RTIA) on 
preventing bribery (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010, Peisakhin 2012). The RTIA is a freedom of information 
law that established the right of citizens to secure access to information under the control of public 
authorities within 30 days with the purpose of promoting transparency and accountability of public 
sector institutions. 
The first intervention by Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) sought to test whether underprivileged citizens 
seeking to obtain benefits from public social programs could make use of the RTIA instead of resorting 
to bribery. To this effect, 86 underprivileged slum dwellers were randomly selected and assigned into 
three experimental groups and one control group before applying for a subsidised food ration card. 
While the first group submitted their application and did not follow up, the second group attached a 
recommendation letter from an NGO to their application, the third group paid a bribe and the fourth 
group filed an RTI request to follow up on their application. 
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The results for each experimental group were measured in terms of the average processing time to 
obtain the ration card. The differences recorded were significant. The fastest results were obtained by 
the group that utilised speed money (median processing time of ca. 6 weeks) followed by the group 
filing an RTI request (processing time of approximately 4 months). In contrast, only a few participants in 
the NGO intervention group and the control group received a ration card within a 1-year window. This 
suggests that although resorting to RTIA is not as effective as bribery, it is still substantially more 
effective than the standard application procedure or reliance on NGO support. The authors concluded 
that India’s RTIA is almost as effective as bribery in helping the poor gain access to public services due 
to increased transparency and voice even in highly unequal and socially stratified societies – thus 
emphasising the importance of the availability of legal channels to overcome some of the challenges 
arising out of social inequality. 
The second study by Peisakhin (2012) tested the effectiveness of the RTIA as an alternative to bribery 
when registering to vote and to measure effects on the quality the delivery of public services. This study 
involved lower and middle-to-high class citizens, who were randomly selected and assigned to 3 field 
experimental groups and 1 control group. Two RTI groups were formed, one consisting of lower class 
individuals and the second of middle to upper class individuals. These groups were informed about the 
existence of the RTIA and asked to file an RTI request after applying for a voter registration card. One 
bribery group resorted to speed money to obtain their voter registration. A final control group consisted 
of individuals who adhered to standard administrative procedures to apply for their voter registration 
cards.  
Results showed that again the bribers were most successful, waiting 123 days to receive the voting 
cards. Next came the middle-to-upper class applicants from the FOIA group, who waited on average 
150 days to obtain their voter ID, whereas lower income FOIA participants awaited 164 days in average. 
These results were still significantly better than those obtained by the control group participants who 
had to wait 219 days. This second study confirmed the previous findings that recourse to the RTIA is 
almost as effective as bribery in expediting processing times of public services. Furthermore, only minor 
differences were detected between low and middle-to-high citizens. The author concluded that freedom 
of information not only leads to higher levels of transparency, administrative efficiency and lower 
incidences of bribery, but also has the potential to overcome and reduce class differences.   
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4.5.2 Discussion  
Figure 5 summarises the interventions reviewed in this group and their outcomes. 
 
The two studies considered in this group focus on the incentives of service providers to perform their 
duties efficiently and transparently.  
The results from the studies suggest that the RTIA can exert a strong effect towards improving 
efficiency (measured in processing times) in service delivery. These findings show that formal legal 
accountability instruments can play an important role in positively influencing effort level and 
performance of service providers by means of restructuring incentives. In this case, the effect of a 
formal RTI is to trigger a formal monitoring mechanism that, in the perspective of the service provider, 
embodies the possibility of punitive action if substandard work performance is revealed. Interestingly, 
the RTI impact on providers’ incentives appears to be more a consequence of changed perceptions on 
the likelihood of being punished for underperformance rather than actual experiences of enforcement of 
sanctions as the Right to Information Act’s penalty provisions are rarely used. Rather, the authors 
suggest that in India’s competitive bureaucracy service providers share the perception that any blemish 
on a public servant’s career, whether punished or not, can negatively affect his or her chances of 
promotion.  
4.6 Group 6: Mixed (top-down and bottom-up) anti-corruption intervention 
4.6.1 Description of the study and results 
This group includes one single intervention, an experimental study (Olken, 2007) that contrasted a 
centralised (top-down) state monitoring intervention with a decentralised (bottom-up) citizen 
participatory programme that sought to tackle problems of local capture and rent-seeking on the part of 
local elites during the implementation of road infrastructure projects in Indonesia. The study involved 
608 villages that were about to start an infrastructure project funded by the central government.  
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The villages were divided into 3 experimental groups: in the first treatment group the local implementing 
authorities were told of an imminent government audit prior to beginning the construction. The second 
treatment group involved a community monitoring mechanism in which participants were invited to 
attend special ‘accountability meetings’ and to directly participate in the monitoring of the project 
implementation. The third group involved the same participatory scheme as group two but added the 
possibility for participants to input anonymous comments into sealed drop boxes.  
The study found that grassroots participation increased notably in the social accountability (second and 
third) groups. Furthermore, village meetings were more likely result in some action to resolve 
corruption-related problems where the possibility for providing anonymous inputs was offered. However, 
discussions of corruption-related problems during village meetings also showed that community 
members were more interested in monitoring the correct payment of their own wages, rather than 
paying attention to the misappropriation of building materials by local authorities. Furthermore, village 
meetings were susceptible to capture by village heads, who selectively showcased comment forms from 
villagers favourable to their own particular interests and whose supporters vastly outnumbered other 
community members. As a consequence, the author notes that increased citizen mobilisation did not 
result in reduced corruption outcomes measured by the extent of missing resources. In contrast, the 
top-down audit treatment had a significant positive impact in reducing budget leakages.  
4.6.2 Discussion 
Figure 6 summarises the intervention reviewed in this group and its outcomes. 
 
This study makes a case for the superior effectiveness of centralised anti-corruption instruments (such 
as audits) in deterring embezzlement of public funds on the part of subnational level actors as 
compared to citizen monitoring activities. The findings are especially relevant in contexts such as the 
Indonesian, where power asymmetries and social cleavages at the community level heighten the risk of 
capture of citizen participatory interventions by local elites.  
However, this study also confirms the relevance of behavioural factors in impacting the propensities of 
public officials to engage in corrupt actions. Similar to the studies by Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) and 
Peisakhin (2012), Olken’s (2007) findings show how the threat of sanctions (as opposed to actual, 
instances of enforced sanctions) can act as a strong deterrent to corruption.   
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5 Synthesis analysis and policy 
considerations 
The synthesis of the literature across the two review questions allows us to extract one important 
overarching message for policy practitioners:  
Overall, the practice of anti-corruption should be adequately contextualised to account for what the 
behavioural approach reveals as critical factors impacting the perspectives and preferences of citizens 
(service users) and public officials (service providers). Concretely, the review illustrates the importance 
of understanding the social context including factors such as social cleavages, informal networks as 
well as collectively held mental models. 
It is meaningful that among the reviewed interventions, those yielding improved governance outcomes - 
whether by conventional accountability or behavioural channels - involved substantive sectors and/or 
topics that were clearly and immediately relevant to the intended beneficiaries. Thus, interventions that 
managed to establish a strong connection between the desired changes in behaviour and improved 
welfare for individuals and their families in the form of tangible benefits were more likely to succeed in 
eliciting change than those that appealed to more abstract goals and values. 
Therefore, the evidence stemming from the literature review suggests that individuals - citizens and 
public officials alike – while influenced in their choices by behavioural factors, are nonetheless acutely 
pragmatic and will respond to stimuli they find useful, credible and beneficial.  
In this final section, this main lesson is further discussed with regards to what the review revealed about 
the importance of information and of understanding the social context. Subsequently, the report 
concludes with a reflection on the concrete implications for programming anti-corruption interventions. 
5.1 Harnessing the power of information 
The importance of information in the fight against corruption is evident and the literature confirms that 
the right use of it may trigger changes in behaviour strengthening formal accountability structures for 
service providers and promoting a sense of empowerment among citizens. However, the review 
exercise also underscores the importance of tailoring the information used for anti-corruption purposes 
to fully take account of the context. Of particular importance are the factors that shape perceptions of 
citizens and service providers about the acceptability of corrupt behaviours and the prevalence of 
environmental cues or mental models leading to rash decision-making associated to corruption. Ideally, 
the right type of information should effectively convey a strong anti-corruption message and rebut 
environmental cues leading to corruption (in contexts where corruption is perceived to be the norm). 
5.1.1 Citizens and service users 
Successful social accountability interventions in the review utilised information that provided compelling 
evidence that helped override expectations or mental models about the corruption being normal and 
harmless. Such information made a convincing link between corruption and the costs citizens endure as 
a direct consequence of it, such as lack of adequate medical treatment. Thus, although the information 
in most of the reviewed intervention studies does not elaborate on possible behavioural effects, based 
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on the assessment (GTR) of the literature it is possible to propose that people will respond to 
compelling evidence that questions or contradicts those narrow frames and mental models that they - 
ceteris paribus - respond to.   
As the behavioural literature suggests, automatic thinking and associated behaviours are significantly 
influenced by perceptions about reciprocity and solidarity in a given society. Therefore, when people 
assume that bribing and sub-standard service quality are the natural state of affairs, these perceptions 
and expectations become normalised and engrained as narrow frames in people’s minds. Consistent 
with the importance of reciprocity and other similar values, the reviewed studies suggest that individuals 
react to abuse of power and injustice even in highly corrupt countries. 
One of the interventions reviewed illustrates this particularly well. In the study by Björkman-Nyqvist et 
al. (2014), open discussion about service delivery problems between citizens and service providers was 
dominated by a narrative where providers blamed limited resources and lack of funds for the problems 
of poor service delivery. Very little changed as a result. However, markedly better outcomes were 
obtained when the intervention participants received benchmark information that clearly showed the 
performance levels of their local health services compared to other facilities and to the national 
average. Such information was effective because it allowed users of underperforming facilities to 
recognise that the quality of services they were receiving was not the simply the normal standard to be 
expected, but could in fact be attributed to various types of corrupt practices among the health 
workers.  
Information on budget allocations might also be conducive to overcoming narrow frames that would 
justify an expectation of bad service quality. Such effect was attained in the study by Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004, 2009, 2011) by providing communities with data on tracked expenditure vs. budget 
allocation for the provision of public services, as well as in the observational study by Francken (2009) 
that used information on the disbursement of public funds. Along similar lines, other studies suggest 
that information about salaries of high earning public officials may motivate individuals to denounce 
corruption and expose underperformance (Bar and Serra 2009, Abbink 2004).  
These studies all suggest that concrete information such as that about budgets and performance of the 
local public services motivates service users to question underperformance and become active 
accountability seekers. By linking corruption to critical underperformance of local public services, this 
type of information may be more effective at changing attitudes of tolerance towards corruption than 
simply sharing information about incidence of corruption as evidenced by the unsuccessful intervention 
described by Banerjee (2008).  
Information also seems to be effective when it promotes ownership and direct control by citizens. 
Successful citizen engagement was achieved, for instance, when the intervention participants were 
given an active role in generating performance assessments (Björkman/Svenssøn 2009). In the study 
by Duflo et al (2012) positive outcomes were attained when parents were trained, not on abstract rights 
and entitlements but rather on how to monitor and assess teachers’ performance. Similarly, in Reinikka 
and Svenssøn (2004, 2009 and 2011), the campaign’s success was linked to the dissemination of 
information on how to monitor the handling of funds at public schools. In all these examples,  
information empowered citizens to identify concrete evidence of state capture, mismanagement and 
underperformance.  
Positive results were also recorded in interventions that stressed messages about the importance of 
enjoying access to quality public services. Such information may remind citizens about the value of 
education for promoting their own and their children’s wellbeing, as demonstrated by Keefer and 
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Khemani’s (2011) educational radio campaign in Benin. The subsequent study by these authors (2014) 
illustrated that the revalorisation of essential public services had an additional effect of lowering 
preferences for patronage practices of recruitment of ill prepared staff that would affect the standard of 
service provision. However, the same was not true of other practices such as vote buying and the 
distribution of patronage in the form of gifts by political leaders, which continued to be openly 
accepted, presumably at least in part because the costs of political corruption may not be obvious at 
first sight. From the perspective of the recipients of a patronage “gift” it is clear that they receive a 
short-term concrete and measureable benefit whereas the longer-term uncertain benefit from rejecting 
such gifts is less obvious. In fact, this and other studies provide insights on why interventions centring 
on awareness raising about corrupt activities of politicians and public officials seem to lack 
effectiveness, especially in contexts where corruption is perceived to be the normal state of affairs. 
Banerjee’s study on ethnic voting in India (2010) shows how preferences for voting for members of 
one’s own caste do not change significantly even when they are knowingly and openly corrupt. Tellingly, 
the parallel campaign that emphasised the impact of caste-based voting on development achieved 
significantly better outcomes (ibid) suggesting that voters tended not to appraise the suitability of 
political candidates based on their corrupt records but rather on their expected ability to deliver positive 
outcomes. Thus, in India where corruption is endemic and graft is normalised (Peisakhin and Pinto 
2010, Gächter 2009, Meagher et al. 1999), individuals may develop greater tolerance towards 
corruption – with the result that information on corruption becomes a powerless nudge.  
The lesson drawn from the analysis of these studies is that in order to address the social acceptability 
of corruption, a clear and forceful message needs to be articulated as to how different types of 
corruption have a direct and tangible impact on the wellbeing of citizens. Another implication from the 
analysis is the need to reflect on how the use of information on corruption levels should be used when 
designing anti-corruption strategies in contexts where corruption has become normalised and socially 
accepted. In the worst-case scenario, the dissemination of corruption data, such as high levels of 
bribery, may reinforce individuals’ perception that most others are indeed corrupt and thereby bolster 
their propensity to think of and resort to corruption as the default behaviour. Drawing from what we 
have learnt from the review of anti-corruption campaigns, the implication would be that the emphasis 
should be made on conveying clear and concrete examples of how corruption hurts the welfare of 
citizens.  
5.1.2 Public officials and service providers 
The studies reviewed highlight important lessons about how corrupt behaviours of public officials can be 
significantly deterred. In all cases, the key factor was to make the threat of detection and punishment 
more likely and credible. Thus, success was linked to interventions that changed perceptions about the 
presence of monitoring mechanisms and of more stringent enforcement of sanctions. These success 
stories throw light into how behavioural mechanisms might be at play in the fight against corruption.  
The behavioural literature suggests that individuals who engage in corrupt actions typically 
underestimate the probability of being caught (Djawadi and Fahr 2013), in extreme cases even leading 
them to believe that impunity is the normal state of affairs. An interesting implication for policy making 
is the fact that, according to these behavioural studies, the decisions of individuals on whether to 
engage in corrupt behaviours depend on their perceptions about the likelihood of punishment, which 
may not strongly correspond to the actual effectiveness of the prevailing corruption detection systems.  
Two of the studies reviewed appear to have succeeded in deterring corruption precisely by effectively 
altering the perception of the likelihood of detection by conveying messages about increased 
monitoring. In one intervention in Uganda, the availability of information instructing citizens on how to 
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monitor the handling of budget allocations was enough to drastically reduce embezzlement of funds, 
even without evidence that citizens were actually undertaking the monitoring (Reinikka/Svenssøn 
2004, 2009 and 2011). Similarly, Olken’s work (2007) in Indonesian communities showed that social 
accountability initiatives were significantly less successful in preventing embezzlement of public funds 
than a non-existent audit of which local government officials were alerted.  
A similar effect is corroborated by other studies that showcase the positive impact of increased 
transparency. The experiments by Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) and Peisakhin (2012) demonstrate how 
the Indian Right to Information Act (RTIA) successfully influenced the incentives of service providers to 
work more efficiently. Right to Information (RTI) requests submitted along with food ration and voter 
registration applications provided a concrete mechanism whereby handling of those applications could 
be traced and thus faulty performance sanctioned. The improvement in efficiency that the RTI-
supported applications reported was significant. Therefore, these studies showed that service providers 
react to the perspective of having underperformance reports smearing their records with the 
consequent negative impact on their professional and personal career advancement.  
This deterrence effect, which appears to yield more than commensurate responses to the actual 
improvements and/or enforcement of detection mechanisms, has been further confirmed by van 
Veldhuizen (2013) whose experimental work confirmed that the propensity to extract rents goes down 
disproportionately compared with even marginal improvements in monitoring. Also along these lines, 
Bateson et al. (2006) manipulated simple environmental cues (pictures of watchful eyes on the wall) to 
significantly reduce cheating at a self-service coffee station. These insights also point to the potential of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) as instruments that, by making public 
administration and service delivery more transparent and thus traceable, convey a credible message 
about an increased likelihood of detection among service providers (Krolikowski, 2014). 
Several other studies also indicate that bottom-up monitoring (or the perception of being monitored) 
can have important effects on anti-corruption, which may be especially relevant in contexts where the 
implementing capabilities of the state are weaker at the local level. Citizen monitoring was conducive to 
more equitable provision of health and education entitlements across all castes in one Indian study 
(Pandey et.al 2007, 2008), and parental monitoring of teachers accounted for better school 
performance and learning outcomes in Kenya (Duflo et al 2012). These findings are further supported 
by several observational studies that have demonstrated that interventions instructing citizens on how 
to file complaint procedures to report corruption are associated to a positive impact in diminishing 
discretionary powers and rent seeking behaviours on the part of state officials and service providers 
(Krolikowski 2014, Caseley, 2003, Callen and Hasanain, 2011, Deininger and Mpuga, 2004, Mahmood, 
2004)  
In sum one of the main insights from the cross-synthesis of the literature is that information should not 
only be easy to grasp but must also have practical relevance for the intended target groups. In other 
words, information must be clearly associated with concrete actions that have an impact on the 
incentives of citizens (better public services) and public officials (increased risk of corrupt behaviours 
being exposed and punished) while taking into account context-specific biases and commonly shared 
perceptions about the normality of corruption and degree of impunity. Thus, strategically formulated 
information on the costs of engaging in and condoning corrupt transactions may be more effective in 
deterring corrupt behaviours than information illustrating the mere prevalence of corrupt practices 
(Djawadi and Fahr 2013). 
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5.2 Accounting for social context and the prevalence of social bias 
Another of the main lessons learnt from the review is that adequately accounting for the social context 
in the development of anti-corruption interventions involves understanding prevailing social cleavages 
and informal social networks.  
Several of the studies in the review demonstrate how social cleavages generate risks of elite capture of 
anti-corruption social accountability interventions. Such concerns are particularly common in contexts 
where local elites are in an advantageous position to take control of the initiative and steer it towards 
serving their own particularistic agendas. Four of the reviewed experimental studies (Pandey et al. 
2007, Pandey et al. 2008, Banerjee et al. 2008, Olken 2007) showed how social cleavages in the Indian 
and Indonesian contexts can compromise the effectiveness of social accountability interventions as a 
result of elite capture. The observational studies reviewed further support that, when local power 
asymmetries are pronounced, even well meaning anti-corruption initiatives may trigger undesirable 
outcomes as elite capture not only reinforces and perpetuates patterns of social domination and 
exclusion (Rodall and Mendoza, 2004, Fritzen, 2007) but can also fuel higher levels of ‘decentralised 
corruption’ (Shankar, 2010). Furthermore, differences in social status and the interference by local 
elites can greatly affect the willingness of community members to hold public officials to account, 
especially when citizens are fearful of the repercussions from reporting corrupt behaviours (Caseley, 
2003, Rodall and Mendoza 2004, Shankhar 2010, Callen and Hasanain, 2011, Wild and Harris, 2011, 
King, 2015). 
The GTR review pointed to the importance of informal social networks, which may be constituted along 
several different criteria such as family, clan, village, friendship, or professional association. Such 
networks are typically bound together by affectionate social ties and links (Anders, 2002) and rely upon 
a strong sense of obligation towards the group (Blundo and De Sardan  2006, De Sardan 1999, Hyden 
2005, Harris 2007, Pfeiffer and Rose 2014, Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga 2015). The cross-synthesis 
analysis of these studies suggests that the appropriation of corrupt opportunities can be linked to high 
levels of social pressure by informal networks (cf. Meagher et al. 1999). In the review of experimental 
studies, the findings by Duflo (et al. 2012) showed how public school teachers took advantage of the 
availability of new staff positions to promote hiring of members of their informal social networks. 
Furthermore, the expectations about fulfilling the obligation to one’s group extend to the political realm 
and are presumably linked to the entrenchment of clientelistic networks and practices of patronage, as 
illustrated by the experimental studies by (Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013 and Vicente 2007).  
The review also suggests that informal social networks are important from the perspective of their 
members to the extent that the networks are functional. Social networks are coping mechanisms that 
help “get things done” and gain access to resources. The review evidences the relevance of this point 
not only for the case of African countries (Baez Camargo and Sambaiga 2015, Baez Camargo and 
Passas 2017) but also in India (Jaregui 2014, Ruud 2000), South Korea (Chang et.al 2001) and in most 
of Eastern Europe and Asia (Grodeland et al. 1998, Ledeneva 1997, Sneath 2002).  
Although the high value ascribed to informal social networks can be seen to originate in patterns of 
sociality and cultural traits, the argument seems incomplete and questionable without recognising the 
functionality of those networks. In the analysis, this is another aspect in which the pragmatism of 
individuals stands out as highly relevant. Such considerations can explain the lack of success of 
Fujiwara and Wantchekon’s (2013) non-clientelist candidacy campaign and Vicente’s (2013) anti vote-
buying campaign – both of which had negative effects on voter turnout. Seen through the lens of the 
informal reciprocity precept inherent to social networks, it is plausible to think that voters either 
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abstained from voting altogether or stopped to support a formerly clientelist candidate who suddenly 
endorsed a policy platform because they were suddenly cut off from the resources they felt entitled to.  
5.3 Anti-corruption interventions’ focus and implications for programme design 
The synthesis review of the literature allows us to infer implications for policy practitioners making 
decisions about the focus and programme design for interventions targeting petty corruption.  
A key lesson drawn from the cross-synthesis is that local actors are pragmatic and most likely to 
respond to interventions that target problems and identify solutions in sectors that they themselves 
deem relevant and salient – and which have a direct positive impact on their personal welfare. This 
suggests that selection of a particular sector for an anti-corruption campaign should be informed by an 
understanding of the areas that are most relevant for the intended campaign beneficiaries. The review 
of anti-corruption interventions strongly supports this point, since all successful social accountability 
campaigns were conducted in sectors where the practical benefits derivable from lower corruption 
levels and better service are more obvious, namely health and education. The successful campaigns 
furthermore emphasised the link between corruption and welfare, thus bolstering the impact of 
participatory monitoring activities.  
In contrast, corrupt practices such as clientelism, vote-buying and patronage, proved more difficult to 
tackle in the reviewed studies due to the direct benefit they bring to voters. This means that targeting 
political corruption effectively should probably involve a substantial effort to compellingly demonstrate 
the negative links of patronage and associated practices with individual welfare. Otherwise, it is highly 
likely that the promotion of political rights and the call for political accountability come across as rather 
abstract concepts, lacking appeal especially to the most vulnerable groups, whose education levels 
tend to be extremely low. Furthermore, interventions targeting practices of patronage face additional 
challenges of a behavioural nature, such as preferences for risk aversion and short time horizons in 
decision-making. It is thus difficult to expect individuals to forgo a small - but certain - benefit (such as 
the gift or money received for voting a certain way) immediately, in exchange for a less certain - though 
supposedly larger – benefit (better health services and public education) at an indefinite point in the 
future. 
It is therefore recommendable to evaluate the choice of sector targeted for the anti-corruption 
intervention in terms of the expected value given by citizens to improved performance and service 
delivery outcomes. The superior effectiveness of the campaigns targeting education and health services 
as compared to those targeting political corruption corroborates this and suggests that pragmatic 
people are more receptive to initiatives that they perceive as having a more direct repercussion on their 
welfare.  
Another important message from the cross-analysis of the literature emphasises the importance of 
assessing the social context to determine the feasibility and potential impact of different types of 
intervention. Thus, in principle the literature seems to indicate that social accountability interventions 
that encourage direct control by participants tend to be more effective. However, as indicated by the 
study by Björkman-Nyqvist (et al. 2014) direct control in and of itself may not be effective in the 
absence of access to relevant information. This combination of empowerment of social accountability 
participants through information and direct control is corroborated by several of the intervention studies 
reviewed (Pandey et al 2007 and 2008, Duflo et al. 2012, Björkman and Svenssøn 2009), as well as 
some of the observational studies (Rodall and Mendoza 2004, Meagher et al. 1999, Wild and Harris 
2011). 
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Also, the experimental studies from India strongly advise about exercising caution in rolling out social 
accountability interventions in communities where social cleavages are deeply entrenched because of a 
high risk of capture by powerful local actors. Rather, a top-down intervention may be more effective in 
contexts in which enabling credible social monitoring may not be realistic due to the entrenched 
dominance of certain groups, as suggested by the Indonesian study of Olken (2007). It is therefore 
important to contextualise and understand the social and cultural landscape in order to assess the 
feasibility of demand or supply-side interventions.  
However, in terms of intervention design the cross-synthesis mostly suggests that no one approach is 
by definition preferable or superior to others. Thus, while undoubtedly valuable, bottom-up participatory 
approaches are not a substitute to traditional top-down accountability mechanisms or a functional state 
able to implement policies and enforce rules. In a similar fashion, the findings also suggest that 
informing the design of social accountability with behavioural insights can be potentially fruitful. Overall, 
the key message is about the critical importance of adequately contextualising anti-corruption. As 
members of the UK Behavioural Insights Team shared with the authors of this review, what is often 
required is the willingness to experiment and test different approaches to find out to which the target 
population is most responsive.14  
The literature review also makes relevant suggestions as to how a behavioural approach may begin to 
be tested in order to promote better control of corruption outcomes: 
First and foremost, good news for policy practitioners is that although prevailing social patterns and 
practices may be very well entrenched, they are not necessarily immutable. Behavioural insights can 
thus provide some ideas for potentially innovative entry points to anti-corruption programming. This 
point has been made by several authors, such as Barr and Serra (2010) and Kapoor and Ravi (2009), 
who claim that enculturated social norms and cultural values and practices of corruption may be 
updated by, for instance, exposure to a better public infrastructure. Other work (Hauk and Saez-Marti, 
2002) suggests that parents, due their ties of affection and responsibility to transmit values to their 
children, are promising intervention subjects to be exposed to ideas that contest conventional wisdom 
and pave the way for better futures.  
Another promising entry area for innovative interventions refers to the power of social networks in 
shaping behaviours. As the GTR literature review made clear, high levels of social capital are compatible 
with both good and bad outcomes. This means that, at least in theory, it should be possible to think that 
in contexts where social networks play an essential role in people’s lives, the values and norms that 
keep the networks functional could be harnessed or nudged to promote positive outcomes. This is not 
only in line with the spirit of “working with the grain” (Booth, 2011), but also may be an especially 
effective channel of eliciting changes in behaviours. Certainly, more work remains to be done in this 
area although more recent research has demonstrated important behavioural impacts whereby strong 
contagion effects take place across social networks.15 This type of findings speak of the enormous 
potential of devoting further energies and efforts to understanding how social networks promote 
behaviours that are associated with corruption, including the understandings and expectations 
enveloping those behaviours and, of course, coming up with novel ideas that could promote behavioural 
change precisely by means of the logic upon which those networks operate. 
                                                      
14
 Meeting with Luke Ravenscroft, Head of International Programmes, and colleagues at the Behavioural Insights Team headquarters in 
London, on 19th April, 2017. 
15
 Such as the work by Yale Professor Nicholas Christakis, see http://nicholaschristakis.net/  
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Regardless of the specific type of intervention, the cross-synthesis and analysis strongly threw into 
relief the power of information in triggering behavioural responses. This underscores the importance of 
carefully informing decisions about the messages to be delivered through the intervention with evidence 
from the local contexts. The messages should be directly relatable to the pragmatic interests of the 
relevant actors, whether by exposing otherwise hidden costs inflicted by corruption or by making 
threats about detection and punishment credible. Thus, there appears to be great potential in exploring 
the impact of disseminating broader messages that contest the conventional wisdom of mental models 
by demonstrating the benefits of alternative behaviours and/or the hidden costs of corruption. This is 
one of the major messages emerging from the review analysis.  
Finally, cues in the closer environment can send out strong messages, in the form of unwritten 
information, which may nevertheless trigger cognitive and behavioural responses related to beliefs 
about corruption. This is probably one of the least explored aspects appearing in the literature on anti-
corruption interventions. However, several behavioural studies suggest how environmental cues may 
send out strong messages capable of overshadowing even the most articulated information campaign. 
For example, authors such as Zaloznaya (2014) describe how the perception about how others behave 
is critically important in shaping individual choices. Therefore, in contexts where everyone is expected 
to be corrupt, the strong automatic response is to be corrupt as well. Ironically, in such contexts, 
dissemination of data confirming high levels of bribing may reinforce resorting to corruption as the 
default behaviour.  
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